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THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PAYMENT OF LOBOLO AND ITS IMPACT ON 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
NM Ngema* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act1 defines the custom of lobolo as: 
 
Property in cash or in kind, whether known as lobolo, bogadi, bohali, xuma, lumalo, 
thaka, magadi, amabheka or by any other name, which a prospective husband or 
the head of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife’s 
family in consideration of a customary marriage.2 
 
Various communities in South Africa practise the custom of lobolo, which people give 
different names, is shown above. These communities may be divided into two 
groups, those practicing theleka and those that do not. This article will focus on 
those communities that practise theleka.3 In the communities practising theleka the 
amount of lobolo is not fixed and the father or guardian of the wife may from time 
to time theleka the wife (her married daughter) and demand one to three head of 
cattle from his son-in-law.4 The wife and her children, if there are any, may be held 
by their maternal grandfather until the payment of lobolo has been met.5  
 
                                                          
*  Nqobizwe Mvelo Ngema. LLB (UNIZUL), LLM (UNISA), Certificate in Post Graduate Supervision 
(Rhodes). Lecturer, Department of Public Law (University of Zululand). Email: 
nmngema@pan.uzulu.ac.za. I am highly indebted to my colleague, WJ Ndaba, for reading this 
paper. However, the mistakes, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are 
entirely mine. 
1  Section 1(4) Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
2  Section 1(4) Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
3  The custom of theleka takes place when a wife visits her home and after the expiry of the 
normal visiting time she continues to stay at her home and does not return to her husband’s 
home. Her husband then sends messengers to fetch her and they are informed of why she is 
being held. Theleka is the withholding of a wife by her father or guardian from her husband to 
coerce him to pay the outstanding lobolo. Theleka can also be practised when the husband has 
ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting her. The father of the wife may demand a 
beast that serves as damages if the husband has ill-treated his wife. The beast paid may be in 
excess of the lobolo originally specified. See Koyana Customary 12-16. 
4  Rautenbach, Bekker and Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. 
5  Rautenbach, Bekker and Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. 
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The practice of theleka has an effect on the custody of the child and the relationship 
of spouses in a customary marriage. The writer draws this conclusion because the 
wife and her children are held by her guardian or father until the completion of the 
payment of lobolo. The custom of theleka, which serves as a way of enforcing lobolo 
amongst Xhosa communities, seems to be in conflict with the best interest of the 
child as entrenched in the Constitution.6 This is because the court has to consider 
various factors before granting an application7 and it would be unjust if the best 
interest of the child were to be determined by the payment or non-payment of a 
certain number of cattle. The South African Law Commission8 recommended that  
 
Lobolo should not be deemed essential for the validity of customary marriages. If 
parties wish to give lobolo, they should be free to do so, but payment or non-
payment will have no effect on the spouses’ relationship or on their rights to any 
children born of the marriage.9 
 
If this recommendation were to be taken seriously, then the continuation of theleka 
custom may be considered unconstitutional. Unfortunately there is no judgment in 
South Africa since 1994 that has ruled on this issue. This first section of this article 
will discuss the enforcement of lobolo. The second section, dealing with custody in 
customary marriages, will also draw certain inferences. The third section will analyse 
the notion of the best interests of the child again draw certain inferences. The fourth 
section analyses and answers two questions, namely: does the custom of theleka 
constitute abduction? Does the custom of theleka constitute family violence? And it 
makes recommendations based on the discussion and analysis about what should be 
done about theleka custom.  
The following section discusses the enforcement of lobolo in customary law.  
 
2 The enforcement of lobolo in customary law 
 
The manner of enforcing lobolo agreements in customary law varies among different 
cultural groups or tribes in South Africa. Some communities have a fixed amount of 
                                                          
6  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter "the Constitution"). 
7  McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C). 
8  SALRC Harmonisation of the Common Law ch 4. 
9  SALRC Harmonisation of the Common Law ch para 4.3.3.14 at 61. 
NM NGEMA  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
407 / 536 
 
lobolo. The lobolo can be fixed either by agreement between the parties or by the 
accepted custom in that tribe. In tribes that have a fixed amount of lobolo, the 
delivery of lobolo has to take place before the celebration of the marriage.10  
 
It is also worth noting that some communities have no fixed amount of lobolo cattle 
to be delivered, the marriage depending on the delivery of a reasonable number of 
cattle.11 The court has discretion to decide what constitutes a reasonable number of 
lobolo cattle or amount of money, having regard to what average lobolo has been 
established in the community concerned, and bearing in mind the social standing of 
the woman.12 Among various Xhosa communities, the amount of lobolo payable is 
not limited to a specific amount and constitutes a bond of goodwill between the 
families of the bride and the bridegroom for the entire life of the bride and even 
after her death. The prospective bridegroom would be expected to give up one, two 
or three head of cattle each time his father-in-law turned to him for help.13 
Therefore, it is inconceivable that the bridegroom would refuse to give him the cattle 
if he was in a position to help. Moreover, there is the influence of tradition as well as 
the religious sanction.14 There is a belief among traditionalists as well as non-
traditionalists that a woman for whom lobolo was not delivered will not have 
children.15 This does not mean that lobolo buys the reproductive capacity of a 
woman, but that the ancestors will not allow her to procreate.16 The South African 
Law Commission17 has noted that the payment of lobolo 
 
is the framework that people use to express and to bring about complicated 
changes in terms of relationships and deep changes in terms of emotional realities, 
values, attitudes and concepts. It is also the language that the ancestors 
understand and bless. 
 
                                                          
10  Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322.  
11  Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322. 
12  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 163. 
13  Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322.  
14  Malinowski Crime and Custom 52. 
15  Malinowski Crime and Custom 52. 
16  Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322. 
17  SALRC Harmonisation of the Common Law ch 4. 
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This shows that people who adhere to the custom of lobolo view it as a significant 
custom that connects them with their ancestral spirits. Failure to pay it might 
therefore bring bad luck and the bridegroom may encounter difficulties if he resists 
the payment of lobolo. These views on lobolo are affirmed by the observation that 
lobolo is widely practised by most black South Africans, who are not prepared to 
abandon it despite the difficulties it gives rise to. 
 
If the wife’s father or guardian demands a reasonable amount of lobolo, the 
bridegroom has an obligation to comply with those demands.18 The failure to comply 
therewith entitles the father or guardian of the wife to theleka her until the demand 
has been met. This means that the wife, together with her children, can be taken 
back to the wife’s family group and held under theleka until her husband complies 
with the demand for the payment of lobolo.19 The wife’s father or guardian usually 
resorts to theleka rather than a court action for the enforcement of lobolo, and if the 
wife’s father were to institute a court action without resorting to theleka, his son-in-
law could raise the omission to theleka as a defense.20 
 
South African courts have already ruled that the wife’s father or guardian should not 
be entitled to resort to customary law methods for the enforcement of lobolo in 
relation to civil or Christian marriages.21 This shows that the guardianship of children 
born of a civil marriage is governed by common law.22 It is relevant to consider the 
civil law position in regard to this issue. This point is made here because the 
payment of lobolo is not essential to the validity of a civil or Christian marriage. In 
the case of Cheche v Nondabula23 the parties were Hlubis. The father of the 
                                                          
18  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 163; Olivier et al Indigenous Law 28; Soga The ama-Xosa 263 
et seq; Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C& O) 126; Ngxabalaza v Njovane 1939 NAC (C&O) 96. 
19  Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 164; see also the following cases cited by Bekker, namely: 
Mkhohlwa v Mangaliso 1 NAC 202; Tiyeka v Feja 4 NAC 343; Baleni v Sidlo 4 NAC 344; Ntlekwini 
v Maqokolo 4 NAC 345. 
20  Mkohlwa v Mangaliso 1 NAC 202 (1908); Menzi v Matiwane 1964 NAC 58 (S); Monghayelana v 
Msongelwa 3 NAC 292 (1913); Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C&O) 126. 
21  Cheche v Nondabula 1962 NAC 23 (S) 28; Menzi v Matiwane 1964 NAC 58 (S); Monghayelana v 
Msongelwa 3 NAC 292 (1913); Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C&O) 126; Peart Consideration of 
Certain Aspects of Customary Law 56. 
22  Mbuli v Mehlomakhulu 1961 BAC (S) 66; Msomi v Msomi 1968 BAC (N-E) 29; Mvunyiswa v Mayile 
1964 BAC (S) 25. 
23  Cheche v Nondabula 1962 NAC 23 (S). 
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bridegroom (the defendant) was involved in the negotiations that preceded his son’s 
marriage. The defendant paid to the plaintiff eight head of cattle and the equivalent 
of three others in cash as lobolo. The plaintiff sued, among other things, for the 
payment of fourteen head of cattle and one horse as the balance of lobolo. It was a 
custom amongst the Hlubis to have a fixed amount of lobolo of twenty-five head of 
cattle and one horse. The defendant pleaded that he had agreed to pay only twelve 
head of cattle, but the court rejected his evidence and treated the case as one in 
which there was a marriage without an express lobolo agreement. The court held 
that the payment of lobolo is not essential to the validity of a civil or Christian 
marriage. When it is paid in a civil marriage the lobolo contract is ancillary to the 
marriage contract and must be subject to a special agreement and cannot be 
implied. The court held further that the custom of theleka is not consistent with 
Roman-Dutch law of marriages. 
 
In a similar case of Gomani v Baqwa24 the plaintiff sued for the return of lobolo paid 
by him to the defendant whose daughter he married according to civil rites. In this 
case it was alleged that the woman had committed adultery and deserted the 
plaintiff and thereafter cohabited with Luswazi. This marriage was dissolved by the 
court of the chief magistrate on the ground that the wife committed adultery. The 
magistrate held that the dissolution of a Christian marriage has nothing to do with 
the question of the return of lobolo.  
 
The following section deals with custody in customary law and how it is regulated.  
 
3 Custody in customary law 
 
Custody is defined by Bekker as: 
 
the capacity of a person to have actual physical "possession" of the minor, to live 
with him or her, to take care of him or her and to assist him or her in his or her 
daily life.25 
                                                          
24  Gomani v Baqwa 3 NAC 71 (1917). 
25  Bekker and Van Zyl 2002 Obiter 128. 
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In communities practicing theleka the wife and her children are held by the guardian 
or father of the wife until the payment of lobolo is made. This practice has an impact 
on the custody of the children because the father of the wife gains the possession of 
her daughter together with her children and lives with them until the payment of 
further lobolo has been made. To put it differently, the parents-in-law of the 
husband take custody of his children.  
 
In customary law, the parental rights are determined by the payment of lobolo.26 If 
the husband has complied with his duty to pay lobolo, he and his family group have 
full parental rights to the children had by the wife during the existence of the 
marriage. Customary law places more emphasis on deciding to which family a child 
is linked. This is aptly summed up in Madyibi v Nguva27 as follows: 
 
By nature the progeny of a woman accrue to her father’s group and are members 
of his group and tribe for religious and political purposes … these rights and duties 
are transferred by Native law to another group only on contraction of a valid 
customary union whereby the woman’s group receives lobolo from the other group 
and transfers the natural right to the woman’s productive powers and her progeny 
to the group providing lobolo. 
 
However, our courts are in favour of giving effect to the principle of the best interest 
of the child whenever the custody of the child is under dispute.28  
 
In the case of Hlophe v Mahlalela,29 the court applied the principle of the best 
interest of the child when the father of a minor child was seeking custody of his child 
based on the fact that he had partially paid lobolo. The court was afforded the 
opportunity to consider the award to a father of the custody of his minor children 
after the death of his wife. The spouses had been married under Swazi customary 
law and the payment of lobolo had not yet been settled at the time of death of the 
                                                          
26  Bennett Customary Law 285. 
27  Madyibi v Nguva 4 NAC 40 as quoted by Bekker 2008 Obiter 403.  
28  Mkhize 1951 NAC 336 (NE). There is a great deal of literature on the best interests of the child, 
but it has not been argued that the principle of the best interest ought to be extended even 
during the application of theleka custom. See Bennett 1999 Obiter 145; Knoetze 1999 Obiter 
207-214; Labuschagne 2000 CILSA 333-336; Maithufi "Best Interests of the Child" 137-149. 
29  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD). 
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wife. Van den Heever AJ held that notwithstanding any general customary law 
position regarding the custody of children, the basic principles of customary law 
regulating child custody had been excluded in favour of the common law.30 This 
meant that the principle of best interest of the child took precedence over the basic 
principles regulating custody in customary law.31 This case shows that issues relating 
to the custody of a minor cannot be determined by the mere delivery or non-delivery 
of lobolo.  
 
The custom of theleka has an impact on the custody of children held in terms of that 
custom because the children so held might be prevented from attending a school 
they are used to, or even the quality of the education they receive might be 
affected. In the light of the constitutional protection of the right to education, it 
becomes obvious that theleka carries grave implications. The right to education is 
protected in the Constitution32 and is a universally recognised right. The United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms".33 Parents are vested with the prior 
right to choose the kind of education to be given to their children.34 A similar 
provision is contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. This Covenant recognises the right to education and provides that education 
should be purposive and "directed to the full development of the human personality 
and the sense of dignity".35 It is submitted here that the right of the child to human 
dignity and other rights enshrined in the latter international human rights 
instruments would be violated if he or she were to be prevented from attending 
school just because of the incomplete payment of lobolo for the mother.  
 
The following section analyses the concept of the best interests of the child. 
 
                                                          
30  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458F-G. 
31  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458G-459C.  
32  Section 29 of the Constitution. 
33  Article 26 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
34  Article 26(3) United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
35  Article 13(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
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4 The best interests and wishes of the child 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child36 stipulates that the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning the child. South Africa 
is compelled to implement the principle of safeguarding best interests of the child 
because it is a signatory to the convention. South Africa has gone a further step in 
promoting the best interest of the child by incorporating the principle in section 28 of 
the Constitution, which provides that "a child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child". It has been noted that it is not an 
easy exercise to determine the best interest of the child. Further, the question is 
exacerbated by the fact that the issue has not been given exhaustive treatment in 
South African, foreign or international jurisprudence.37 Furthermore, the wording 
does not prescribe the range of factors that must be considered in determining what 
constitutes the child’s best interests.38 The imprecision that surrounds the concept 
has led one of the commentators to declare that it is indeterminate and working with 
it is similar to exercising "Solomonic judgment."39 The other difficulty about the 
principle is that "what is best for a specific child or children cannot be determined 
with absolute certainty".40 This is aptly summed up in the Constitutional court 
judgment in S v M.41 There Sachs J acknowledged the indeterminacy of the notion of 
"the best interest of the child" and stated that it provides little guidance to those 
given the task of applying it. The learned Justice held that: 
 
… it is necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances 
will determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child. 
Furthermore, the list of factors competing for the core of best interests is almost 
endless and will depend on a particular factual situation.42 
 
Bennett observed that "according to the conventional wisdom in the 1930s, 1940s 
and 1950s, customary law had no particular concern with the welfare of children. 
                                                          
36  Article 3(1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
37  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC). 
38  Kaime African Charter 110. 
39  Mnookin 1975 LCP 226.  
40  Mahlobogwane 2010 Obiter 233; Heaton 1990 THRHR 96-97. 
41  S v M 2008 1 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
42  S v M 2008 1 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
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Instead its emphasis lay on deciding to which family a child should be affiliated".43 It 
is a pity that even today the best interests of the child and the wishes of the child 
are not taken into consideration by those communities that practice the custom of 
theleka as a way of enforcing lobolo agreements. 
 
The failure to consider the best interests of the child and the wishes of the child 
conflicts with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
emphasises the significance of considering the opinion of a child when determining 
his or her best interests. The Convention stipulates that: 
 
1 States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child. 
2 For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law.44 
 
Similarly, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights45 stipulates 
that a child: 
 
Considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding shall in judicial 
proceedings affecting him be granted and be entitled to request the following 
rights: 
a) To receive all the relevant information; 
b) To be consulted and express his or her own views; 
c) To be informed of the possible consequences of compliance with these views 
and the possible consequences of any decision. 
 
                                                          
43  Bennett 1999 Obiter 146. 
44  Articles 12(1) and (2) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The 
provisions of the latter article have been incorporated in s 10 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, 
which provides that: "every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to 
be able to participate in any matter concerning that child has a right to participate in an 
appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration". In a similar 
vein, section 31 deals with major decisions involving the child and stipulates that: (i)(a) Before a 
person holding parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child takes any decision 
contemplated in paragraph (b), that person must give due consideration to any views and wishes 
expressed by the child, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and stage of development.  
45  Article 3 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (1996) (South Africa is a 
signatory of the Convention). 
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The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child46 also protects the best 
interests of the child47 in similar terms to those provided by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. It provides that the views of the child have to 
be taken into consideration in matters affecting the child as follows: 
 
In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of 
communicating his or her own views, [an] opportunity shall be provided for the 
views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative 
as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by 
the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.48 
 
The provisions of the latter international and regional human rights instruments lead 
to an inference that the custom of theleka conflicts with them. The consideration of 
the child’s opinion in matters affecting him or her is of crucial importance because it 
enables the court to be acquainted with the child’s needs, problems and aspirations, 
the kind of relationship he has with each parent, and the child’s personality.49 In 
order for the opinion of a child to be considered, his or her age50 and maturity51 
have to be considered too.  
 
The following section discusses whether theleka custom constitutes abduction or 
not.  
 
                                                          
46  Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
47  Article 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). 
48  Article 4(2) 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990); see also a 19(1) 
which provides that "… no child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when 
a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in 
the best interest of the child". 
49  Grossman and Scherman 2005 Fam L Q 557. 
50  Greenshields v Wyllie 1989 4 SA 898 (W); Oppel v Oppel 1973 3 SA 675 (T); Mathews v 
Mathews 1983 4 SA 136 (SE). In these cases the courts were inclined to consider the age of the 
child rather than the maturity. 
51  McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C); Martens v Martens 1991 4 SA 287 (TPD); Meyer v Gerber 
1999 3 SA 550 (O). In these cases the courts decided to consider the maturity of the child rather 
than the age. 
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5 Does theleka constitute abduction? 
 
Snyman defines abduction as: 
 
[a] person, either male or female, commits abduction if he or she unlawfully and 
intentionally removes an unmarried minor, who may likewise be either male or 
female, from the control of his or her parents or guardian and without the consent 
of such parents or guardian, intending that he or she or somebody else may marry 
or have sexual intercourse with the minor.52 
 
The theleka custom does not constitute abduction, because the action of the father 
or guardian of the wife to resort to theleka custom as a way of enforcing lobolo is 
not unlawful and it is permitted in those communities practising it. The intention of a 
person practicing theleka custom is to enforce lobolo agreement and not to marry or 
have sexual intercourse with the minor. Therefore, the argument that theleka 
custom constitutes abduction is not persuasive. It is submitted here that theleka 
custom does not constitute abduction. 
 
The following section will discuss whether the custom of theleka constitutes family 
violence or not. 
 
6 Does theleka constitute family violence? 
 
The following acts are recognised as domestic violence in the Domestic Violence 
Act:53 physical abuse; sexual abuse; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; 
economic abuse; intimidation; harassment; stalking; damage to property; entry into 
complainant’s residence without consent, where the parties do not share the same 
residence; any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a complainant, where 
such conduct harms, or may cause imminent harm to, the safety, health or wellbeing 
of the complainant. 
 
                                                          
52  Snyman Criminal Law 403. 
53  Section 1(viii) Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (hereafter "the Domestic Violence Act"). 
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In the light of this definition the challenge is that some husbands believe that they 
are entitled to chastise or assault their wives physically because they paid lobolo for 
them.54 Assault is a form of physical abuse that constitutes family violence.55 The 
belief that it is permissible to assault or chastise women is exacerbated by a change 
in the practices regarding the payment of lobolo: nowadays grooms usually pay 
lobolo from their own pockets, rather than having their families pay lobolo for their 
first wives.56 This tendency has led to the limitation of the groom’s family’s ability 
and willingness to intervene in the marriage and to end family violence.57 Currie and 
Bonthuys58 have aptly argued that the vulnerability of women to family violence has 
increased, as follows: 
 
Because lobolo is paid to wives’ fathers and is often spent shortly after being 
received, wives’ families may be reluctant to allow them to return home when they 
suffer domestic violence because of their inability to return the lobolo to the 
husband. Thus women’s own families may collude with violent husbands to trap 
them in abusive marriages.59 
 
On the other hand, theleka custom serves as a way of stopping family violence. It is 
practiced when the husband has ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting 
her. The father or guardian of the wife may request a beast as damages from his 
son-in-law if the latter has assaulted his wife. The beast paid may be in excess of 
the lobolo originally specified. This purpose of theleka custom is good, because it 
reduces instances of family violence by demanding that the wrongdoer (the 
husband) has to pay damages if he has assaulted his wife.  
 
It is noted that, despite its advantages, the custom has weaknesses. This is because 
the payment of one beast or two as damages for assaulting a wife might not be too 
difficult a fine for rich men. Thus a rich man could assault his wife repeatedly 
knowing that he will be able to afford to pay damages. This eventually might expose 
                                                          
54  Bennett Customary Law 251. 
55  See also s 1(xvi) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
56  Bennett Customary Law 228, 230. 
57  Curran and Bonthuys 2005 SAJHR 616-617. 
58  Curran and Bonthuys 2005 SAJHR 616-617. 
59  Curran and Bonthuys 2005 SAJHR 616-617. 
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rural women to family violence despite the practice of theleka custom, which is 
otherwise designed to protect them.  
 
The chastisement of a wife by her husband is a family matter that is generally 
regarded as a private matter and is not meant for the eyes and ears of outsiders, 
and communities disapprove of women who resort to public forums to deal with 
domestic violence.60 A wife would therefore approach a traditional court only as a 
last resort. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Domestic Violence Act, which 
aims to provide speedy, effective and accessible relief to various complainants,61 
seems to be an unfulfilled dream to rural women. This is because it can be enforced 
only by Magistrate Courts and Family Courts62 and traditional courts have no 
authority to issue protection orders. This poses problems because there are 
approximately 1500 traditional courts operating in South Africa.63 It is argued that 
rural women under the jurisdiction of these traditional authorities might be limited 
by linguistic and economic reasons from accessing Magistrates’ Courts and Family 
Courts. This weakness is a matter of serious concern "if one considers the fact that 
almost 32 per cent of South Africa’s traditional communities of about 35 million 
people live in the rural areas and therefore fall under the authority of traditional 
authorities".64 As a result, it is submitted that there is a need to extend the authority 
to impose protection orders to traditional courts. At the same time it is also 
submitted that the custom of theleka does not constitute family violence. 
The following section discusses what should be done about theleka custom in order 
for it to accord with the Constitution. As will be seen, it will be argued that the 
theleka custom ought to be developed. 
 
                                                          
60  Lempert 2003 Agenda 89-100. 
61  See the preamble of the Domestic Violence Act.  
62  See the definition of a court in s 1 of the Domestic Violence Act. 
63  Bennett Customary Law 141; clause 16(1) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution. 
64  Rautenbach 2005 SAJHR 334. 
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7 Development of theleka custom 
 
It is noted that the Constitution65 protects the right to culture in numerous 
provisions which refer to the cultural diversity of the South African population. The 
preamble to the Constitution, for instance, clearly refers to the diversity of the South 
African population. The Constitution66prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds 
inter alia of culture. In addition the Constitution67 provides for the protection and the 
promotion of the rights of traditional, religious, cultural and linguistic communities. It 
also provides for the establishment of a Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities68 and 
chapter 12 deals with the recognition and role of traditional leaders. It is crucial to 
note that all of the constitutional provisions dealing with the promotion and 
protection of the right to culture and religion are subject to the values that underlie 
the Constitution. In order for the latter rights to have meaning and true protection 
there is a necessity to start by developing a customary rule in accordance with the 
Constitution whenever possible, and to use abolition only as a last resort. 
 
Section 39 of the Constitution provides that: 
 
1 When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) Must consider international law; and 
(c) May consider foreign law 
2 When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
object of the Bill of Rights. 
3 The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other right and freedoms 
that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to 
the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. 
 
                                                          
65  Sections 30, 31, 211 and 212 of the Constitution. 
66  Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
67  Sections 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution. 
68  Sections 185 and 186 of the Constitution. 
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The court’s obligation as provided in the above section is emphasized in the case of 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,69 where the Constitutional Court held 
that: 
The obligation of courts to develop common law in the context of the section 39 
objectives is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) 
read with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in 
promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general obligation to 
develop it appropriately. 
 
The Carmichele case applies equally to the development of customary law. When a 
customary law rule deviates from the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, 
courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove such deviation.70 The 
development of customary law is important because "once a rule is struck down, 
that is the end of that particular rule, yet there may be many people who observe 
the rule".71 Theleka custom is still practised in some communities72 and it serves a 
twofold purpose, namely the enforcement of lobolo and the prevention of violence 
directed against married females.  
 
Despite the good intentions underlying the theleka custom, it violates the best 
interests of the child because the voice of the child is not heard when the child is 
held under theleka, particularly in that it may interfere with the educational rights of 
the child. 
  
8 Conclusion 
 
As has been argued above, the rights of a child are still severely affected and not 
taken into consideration in those communities that practice the custom of theleka. It 
is submitted in this article that the custom of theleka as it is practised at present 
                                                          
69  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
70  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of RSA 
2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 215. 
71  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of RSA 
2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 215. 
72  Rautenbach, Bekker ans Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. 
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impacts on the custody of children and clashes with the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,73 the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child,74 the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s 
Rights75 and the Constitution of South Africa.76 This conclusion is made here because 
the best interests of a child and the opinion of the child are not taken into 
consideration when practicing theleka custom, while the international instruments 
mentioned above emphasise that the views of a child have to be considered in 
matters affecting him or her. It is submitted that theleka custom needs to be 
developed to consider the opinion and wishes of the child in order for it to be in line 
with the Constitution. This article has drawn an inference that theleka custom 
neither constitutes abduction nor family violence and that the practice should be 
allowed to continue. 
                                                          
73  Article 12(1) and (2) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
74  Articles 4(2) and 19(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) (South 
Africa is a signatory). 
75  Article 3 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (1996). 
76  Section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
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